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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 12, representatives of the United States and 22 other
countries announced in Geneva their agreement on a set of far-
reaching new rules for the international trading system.1 Although
some loose ends remained, this announcement virtually concluded
the four and one-half year negotiating phase of the Tokyo Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). Negotiators had over-
come an unfavorable world economic climate and awesome politi-
cal and technical complexities to reach agreements covering-
-Trade-distortive government subsidies and countervailing
duties imposed to offset the effects of such subsidies;
-New international rules on dumping, or sales of goods in an
export market at less than fair value, through amendment of the
existing international antidumping code;
-Government procurement, requiring fairness and non-discrim-
ination between imports and domestically produced goods when
specified government agencies buy products for their own use;
-Rules of fairness and non-discrimination in the development
and use of product standards and related tests and certifications;
-Elimination of red tape and delay in the issuance of import
licenses;
-Rational, uniform, and fair methods for appraising the value
of imported goods for the purpose of assessing import duties;
* Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Adjunct Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Indiana University 1965; J.D., Harvard Univer-
sity 1968. During the Tokyo Round negotiations, the author was Deputy General Counsel in
the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Executive Office of the
President. Views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect views of the Carnegie Endowment or the Special Trade Representative's Office.
' This announcement was contained in GATT Doc. MTN/28 (April 11, 1979), a Proce%
Verbal signed by the representatives of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, the nine nations of the European Economic Community, Finland, Hungary,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States. The representative-of Argentina signed "with reservations" with respect to the
texts on government procurement and subsidies/countervailing duties. The representative
of Spain signed "with reservations" with respect to the texts on subsidies/countervailing
duties, on licensing, and on an alternative version of the dairy agreement proposed by
developing countries. Neither representative specified the nature of its government's reser-
vations. See GATT Doc. GATT/1234 (April 12, 1979), a press release setting forth a state-
ment by the GATT Director General and a description of the Tokyo Round agreements.
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-Consultations and exchanges of information with respect to
international trade in bovine meat;
-Consultations, minimum export sales prices, and other ar-
rangements regarding international trade in cheese, milk powder,
and some other dairy products;
-The future treatment of agricultural trade within the interna-
tional trading system;
-Basic reforms of the trading system in order to facilitate the
granting of trade preferences to developing countries, improve in-
ternational procedures for settling trade disputes, modernize the
rules governing restrictions on imports for balance of payments
reasons, and pave the way for a future agreement on export
restrictions; and
-Free trade and fair trading conditions for civil aircraft and
aircraft parts.!
In addition, the representatives reported near-final agreement
on the reduction of tariff rates for thousands of articles traded in-
ternationally.' They also expressed hope that negotiations on the
counterfeiting of established trademarks, such as "Levi's," and on
"safeguard" actions-by which governments limit imports tempo-
rarily in order to aid ailing domestic industries -would be finished
in time to become part of the Tokyo Round results.
President Carter hailed the agreements announced on April 12
as bringing "[a] new order to the world trading system .. . that
will .. .steer us away from destructive protectionism and into a
path of greater export opportunities. . .. '" The President's en-
thusiasm was understandable, but in fact the Tokyo Round results
face several more stiff tests. The agreements still must be approved
and implemented by the United States Congress and other na-
tional parliaments. No developing countries joined in the April 12
announcement,5 and it remains to be seen whether they will do so
' The aircraft agreement, which was begun late in the Tokyo Round, was endorsed only
by Canada, the E.E.C., Japan (with reservations), Sweden, and the United States. Id.
I GATT Doc. MTN/26fRev. 2 (April 11, 1979), reported that delegations representing
twenty-two nations had drawn up "comprehensive records" of their reciprocal tariff com-
mitments, and that these delegations had undertaken to conclude their tariff negotiations
by June 30. These twenty-two countries were Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, the E.E.C. Nine, Finland, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States.
' Statement by the President on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The White House,
April 12, 1979).
5 On April 11, developing country participants in the Tokyo Round issued a statement to
the Trade Negotiations Committee, the steering body for the negotiations, stating:
We regret that the multilateral trade negotiations have failed to achieve greater
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within the next few months and what effect their participation or
abstention will have on the GATT system. Finally, assuming the
Congress approves the agreements and developing countries par-
ticipate, a "shakedown" period of some years probably will be
necessary before the impact of the Tokyo Round can be assessed
with much confidence.
There can be little doubt, however, that the agreements an-
nounced April 12 were a solid first step toward the new trading
order that President Carter foresaw. This summer the Congress
will be debating whether to approve these agreements and enact
legislation proposed by the Administration for implementing
them. It is timely and appropriate, then, to present diverse views
of the Tokyo Round's results in this symposium. I intend, how-
ever, to leave evaluations to the other participants to the extent
possible. As a former participant, or survivor, of these negotia-
tions, my purpose is to lay a foundation by presenting the factual
results as accurately and concisely as possible.
II. THE SETTING6
Perhaps because trade negotiators spend so much time sealed
in airplanes together, they tend to forget that their jargon is not
as widely understood as, say, that of weathermen. A bit of prelimi-
nary background information may help some readers follow the
discussion of the agreements.
results in substance as well as in scope for the trade of the developing countries
within the objectives and principles set out in the Tokyo Declaration. At this
stage we are not able to assess results because negotiations are not completed in
tariff and some non-tariff measures and it shall take time to have a complete pic-
ture of the results in relation to objectives for developing countries' trade in the
Tokyo Declaration....
Statement on Behalf of Developing Countries by Dr. Tomic of Yugoslavia (April 11, 1979)
(unpublished remarks on file at the offices of the Georgia Journal of International and Com-
parative Law). It should be noted, however, that the United States has concluded some
twenty bilateral agreements with developing countries during the course of the Tokyo
Round. These agreements, which cover both tariff and non-tariff matters, have been con-
cluded with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti,
India, Israel, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.
, Portions of this section and those that follow are based upon a manuscript entitled "A
Practitioner's Guide to the Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations," which the author has pre-
pared for publication in a forthcoming issue of the North Carolina Journal of International
Law tind Commercial Regulation. The author also has drawn upon GATT Doe. GATT/1234,
supra note 1, as well as the texts of the agreements, which are cited throughout this article.
For more extensive information about the Tokyo Round, including the state of negotiations
as of late 1978, see Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo
Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1979).
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)7 was for-
mulated in 1947 as a body of rules accepted by nations for the pro-
motion and maintenance of an open and fair international trading
system. The GATT rules are more than merely a statement of in-
ternational principles. They specify procedures for complaints,
reviews of alleged violations and ultimately sanctions against
violators, although such sanctions rarely have been imposed.' The
GATT also maintains in Geneva a relatively small international
secretariat to facilitate meetings of the Contracting Parties and to
oversee the operation of the GATT rules.
The GATT Contracting Parties have sponsored periodic
"rounds" of negotiations aimed at reducing barriers to the inter-
national movement of goods.' Until recently, these "multilateral"
or multination negotiations have concentrated almost exclusively
upon the reciprocal lowering of tariff barriers. Beginning with the
"Kennedy Round" in the mid-1960's, however, there was growing
recognition that tariffs had become less important as obstacles to
trade than more subtle "non-tariff' barriers, such as the exclusion
of (or other discrimination against) foreign suppliers in bidding for
government contracts; failure to certify foreign products as meet-
ing domestic product standards; or the appraising of imports in a
way that artificially inflates their value and thus increases the
duties payable on them. Most of these practices are not adequately
covered by the current GATT rules. From the late 1960's onward
there also has been a growing recognition that the GATT rules
were obsolete, ignored, or in need of strengthening in several key
areas. These included the rules pertaining to government sub-
Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
The Agreement has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current version is
contained in 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected
Documents (1969) [hereinafter cited as "BISD"]. The GATT rules were to have been one com-
ponent of a more comprehensive International Trade Organization, which in turn was to
have joined with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to form the pillars
of the post-war international economic system. When the ITO collapsed in 1949, principally
as a result of the failure of the U.S. Congress to ratify the treaty establishing it, the GATT
rules became the nucleus of a small international organization. For more information about
the background of the GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57
(1969).
, In fact, trade retaliation has been authorized only once, in 1953, in a case involving a
complaint by the Netherlands against U.S. trade restrictions on dairy imports. See id. at
172, citing the decision appearing in BISD (1st Supp.) 23 (1953).
9 The first round after the formation of the GATT took place in 1949 at Annecy, France.
The second was held in 1951 at Torquay, England. The third, fourth, and fifth rounds took
place in 1955, 1960-61, and 1962-67 at Geneva, Switzerland. See J. JACKSON, note 7 supra, at
217-19.
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sidies, to temporary import restrictions under the "escape
clause," to government restrictions on exporting, and to settle-
ment of international trade disputes.
Other changes were stirring the international trading environ-
ment. The European Economic Community (E.E.C.) was emerging
as a trading entity with bargaining strength capable of challenging
the virtual United States hegemony in post-war trading relation-
ships. Less developed countries (LDCs) gained a unified inter-
national voice with the establishment of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, and
were using this forum to promote vigorously trading interests
which in some instances conflicted with such basic tenets of the
GATT system as the most-favored nation (MFN) principle of non-
discrimination.
These factors prompted nearly one hundred foreign ministers,
meeting in Tokyo in September of 1973, to initiate negotiations to
"[c]over tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures which im-
pede or distort international trade in both industrial and
agricultural products .... ,,
This "Tokyo Declaration," which gave a name to the Tokyo
Round and established its terms of reference, also specified that
"[c]onsideration shall be given to improvements in the interna-
tional framework for the conduct of world trade.. . ." and (for the
first time in a GATT-sponsored negotiating round) recognized
"[t]he importance of the application of differential measures to
developing countries in ways which will provide special and more
favorable treatment for them in areas of the negotiation where
this is feasible and appropriate.""
There was no pretense of serious negotiations until, more than
a year following the Tokyo Declaration, the Trade Act of 197412
provided a mandate for United States participation in the negotia-
tions and procedures for approving and implementing the results.
The Trade Act followed the pattern of past trade legislation by
delegating to the President authority to carry out tariff agree-
ments by proclaiming, within specified limits, changes in United
States duty rates.'" The Trade Act broke sharply with tradition,
0 Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, para. 5, reprinted
in BISD (20th Supp.) 19, 21 (1974).
SId. para. 5, BISD (20th Supp.) at 21.
" Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in various sections of 5 & 19 U.S.C.).
, Section 101 of the Act authorizes the President to proclaim tariff reductions of up to
60% for U.S. duty rates that exceed 5% and of up to 100% for duty rates of 5% or less. 19
U.S.C. § 2111 (1976).
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however, in establishing a unique set of procedures for concluding
and implementing agreements on non-tariff matters." Under these
procedures, non-tariff agreements and implementing legislation
submitted by the President cannot be amended by the Congress,
and must be voted up or down within 90 Congressional working
days.'5 These "fast-track" implementing procedures represent an
attempt to balance the desire of the Congress to review agree-
ments (which call in some cases for changes in politically sensitive
United States legislation) and to retain the right to enact or reject
such legislative changes, against the need of United States negoti-
ators to establish credibility with other nations that we will in-
deed act quickly to implement the results of our negotiations.
Foreign memories extending from the League of Nations treaty to
the Havana Charter'" give rise to some understandable skepticism
on this point.
In an attempt to provide some advance assurance that the non-
tariff agreements and legislative changes flowing from them will
be acceptable to the Congress and the American public, the Trade
Act also calls for the President to give the Congress at least 90
days advance notice of the Administration's intention to enter into
non-tariff agreements. This notice was transmitted to the Con-
gress last January 4." The Trade Act further requires the Ad-
ministration, before entering into non-tariff agreements, to consult
about the agreements and their implementation with the House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and with all
other Congressional Committees having jurisdiction over subjects
affected by the agreements or the legislation. These consultations
have been taking place intensively since early March. They have
resulted in detailed recommendations by Congressional Commit-
tees with respect to the content of the implementing legislation.,
These suggestions and other aspects of the evolving implementing
" Trade Act of 1974, §§ 102 and 151, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112 & 2191 (1976).
15 The period for a vote in the Congress is sixty congressional working days unless legis-
lation submitted under these procedures is considered to be a "revenue bill," in which case
the period for voting is ninety Congressional working days. A bill to implement the Tokyo
Round agreements almost certainly will be considered a revenue bill, because it will contain
provisions amending the method of appraising imports for the purpose of imposing tariffs,
as well as other matters affecting the collection of revenue.
"6 The Havana Charter embodied the treaty which would have founded the International
Trade Organization, had that treaty been ratified by the U.S. Senate. See note 7 supra.
' This notice was published in 44 Fed. Reg. 1933 (January 8, 1979).
" These recommendations are set forth in press releases of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee dated March 6, 7, 8, 15, and 26, and April 4 and 5, 1979; and in press releases of the
House Ways and Means Committee dated March 13 and 19, and April 6 and 10, 1979.
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legislation will be referred to frequently below.
Finally, the Congress also provided for participation by desig-
nated members of Congress and their staffs throughout the Tokyo
Round negotiations, 9 and for exchanges of information between
negotiators and an extensive network of private-sector advisory
committees. 20
III. THE AGREEMENTS
The proc~s verbal of April 12 listed one tariff and eleven non-
tariff texts on which negotiations had been concluded, and stated
that these texts would now be submitted for the consideration of
appropriate national authorities. Thus the April 12 agreement
was, in common international terminology, an "initialing" or an ad
referendum agreement.
With the April 12 agreement there began in participating coun-
tries a delicate period of preparing national legislation, Executive
orders and directives that would meet domestic political needs yet
faithfully carry out the obligations expressed in the agreements.
No nation wants gains won in hard negotiations to be nullified by
the way that other nations implement those negotiated results.
The eyes of most participants are on actions of the United States
during this period, both because our separation of powers makes
implementation of international trade commitments somewhat
more cumbersome and uncertain than in parliamentary systems,
and because we have adopted more transparent procedures for
preparing and approving legislative changes than have other
countries. Only when the United States Congress and other legis-
latures have accepted the agreements and faithfully implemented
them-one hopes by this fall-can the Tokyo Round be considered
as successfully concluded.
Early on, the Administration decided to submit all Tokyo Round
non-tariff agreements and their implementing legislation to the
Congress as a single, omnibus bill. The reasons for this approach
were straightforward: the Tokyo Round agreements together are
an interrelated, carefully balanced whole. To submit them sepa-
rately would permit the Congress to accept and implement some
but reject others -an approach with a high probability of causing
the entire fabric of the negotiations to unravel.
The sections below describe briefly the tariff agreement, and
19 U.S.C. § 2211 (1976).
19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1976).
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then present each of the non-tariff agreements with comments
about the current state of U.S. preparations for implementing
legislation where appropriate. Additional sections cover amend-
ments to the framework for the conduct of international trade, as
well as commercial counterfeiting and safeguards (two non-tariff
subjects on which agreements still may be concluded) and the
steel sectoral agreement that was concluded a few months ago
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), but which is closely related to the
Tokyo Round.
A. Tariffs
As part of the April 12 agreement, twenty-two nations" issued
a statement that they were depositing with the GATT Secretariat
records of their reciprocal tariff commitments. This statement
added, however, that these records would not become final obliga-
tions until about June 30, indicating that minor renegotiations as
well as technical corrections might be made until that time.
According to the United States Administration, the records of
tariff concessions submitted on April 12 call for tariff reductions
averaging about 33 percent.u Such a reduction would be compar-
able to the average reduction of 35 percent on dutiable manufac-
tured goods that was negotiated in the Kennedy Round. In this
negotiation, moreover, the United States obtained a number of
tariff concessions of substantial benefit to our agricultural ex-
ports.'
Several qualifications are necessary to make the tariff result in-
telligible. First, not all tariff rates in the United States and other
countries are being reduced by 33 percent. Some products are ex-
cluded altogether from tariff cuts. In the United States, these
products include nonrubber footwear, television receivers, special-
ty steel, and other items subject to "escape clause" import relief
2 Supra note 3.
2 Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Background Paper on the
'Tokyo Round' Multilateral Trade Agreements (April 12, 1979) at 5.
" According to the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, foreign
concessions would offer increased export opportunities for the following U.S. agricultural
exports: "(1) agricultural products exports to Europe, Japan, Canada, and some LDCs; (2)
meat exports, including beef and poultry, to Europe, Japan, Canada, and some LDCs; (3)
tobacco exports to Europe, Canada and Australia; (4) fruit exports to Europe, Japan, and
some LDCs; (5) vegetable exports to Europe, Japan and LDCs; (6) wine exports to Japan
and Canada; (7) oilseed exports to Europe, Japan, Canada, and some LDs; and (8) nut ex-
ports to Europe, Japan and some LDCs." Id
160 [Vol. 9:153
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actions,2 ' as well as other items that negotiators have withheld for
political or tactical reasons. Other articles are subject to greater
or lesser reductions than those called for by the "formula," or
working hypothesis. The tariff formula itself calls for higher duty
rates to be reduced by a greater amount than lower ones, in order
to "harmonize" tariff rates internationally. The figure of 33 per-
cent, then, is the average tariff reduction taking into account
rates that were not reduced, those reduced by more or less than
the formula called for, etc.
The negotiating parties also have agreed that the tariff reduc-
tions, which are to begin on January 1, 1980, will be phased in
over a period of eight years but will be reviewed at the conclusion
of five years to determine whether external economic conditions
warrant their continuation. Considering this eight-year staging of
a relatively modest average tariff reduction, it can be appreciated
why the tariff negotiation was not regarded as the most signifi-
cant part of the Tokyo Round.
B. Non-Tariff Matters
1. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
The GATT system has always had difficulty coping with gov-
ernment aids to industry. This difficulty does not arise so much
from those relatively few subsidies imposed directly for the pur-
pose of promoting exports. The GATT rules and settled practice
generally regard such practices as unfair methods of competition.
Problems arise instead with respect to the myriad forms of sub-
sidies that are viewed by the governments granting them as
legitimate instruments of domestic socio-economic policy, but
which almost incidentally confer advantages upon the recipient in-
dustries in the international marketplace. Some illustrative ex-
amples are nationalizations, tax holidays for those who invest in
economically depressed regions, concessionary loans or direct
grants to maintain full employment during recessions, and grants
for research and development of new technology. Such practices
raise a central dilemma for the international trading system: how
to balance the freedom to make these sovereign national policy
choices against the rights of those whose international competi-
tive position is thereby adversely affected.
' 19 U.S.C. § 2137(b) (1976), requires the President to "reserve from negotiations" any
products subject to outstanding escape clause actions.
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The present GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing duties
seem reasonably straightforward. "Export subsidies" for indus-
trial products are prohibited if they result in a lower price for ex-
port than is charged for the same product domestically. Any
"bounty or subsidy" which causes or threatens material injury to
an industry in another country, or retards the establishment of
such an industry, may be subject to a countervailing duty imposed
by the importing country sufficient to offset the effect of the sub-
sidy.
These deceptively simple rules contain a number of legal and
political problems. Legal problems arise from the fact that there is.
no definition of an "export subsidy," and the line between "export
subsidies" and other, "domestic" subsidies is often wholly unclear.
Politically, an overriding source of international friction has been
the fact that the United States countervailing duty law does not
require a showing of material injury to a domestic industry, as is
required by the GATT rules,"5 so that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury is required to impose duties upon any dutiable imports' found
to be benefitting from a "bounty or grant." Understandably, other
nations have sought in the Tokyo Round to secure adoption by the
United States of an injury standard. Equally understandably, the
United States has sought to ensure that the GATT rules impose
greater discipline over the increasing tendency of governments to
aid their industries in ways that, indirectly at least, confer advan-
tages in the international marketplace.
The agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties' is an at-
tempt to reconcile these positions by providing greater discipline
over the use of subsidies, and by ensuring that the United States
and other signatories to the agreement apply an injury test before
' GATT Art. VI(6(a, 4 BISD at 11, provides that "No contracting party shall levy
any . . . countervailing duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another
contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the ... subsidization ... is such as
to cause or threaten material injury to an established industry, or is such as to retard
materially the establishment of a domestic industry." The clear inconsistency of United
States law with this international obligation is excused by the technicality of "grandfather-
ing"; the United States undertook in 1948 to apply the GATT only to the extent that it was
not inconsistent with pre-existing legislation. The United States countervailing duty law,
which is set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), was first enacted in the 1890's.
" Duty-free imports may only be subject to United States countervailing duties following
a showing of injury. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1976). This provision was first enacted in the Trade
Act of 1974 (previously duty-free goods were not subject to countervailing duties), so that it
has no "grandfather" protection.
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/236.
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imposing countervailing duties against subsidized imports. The
agreement provides greater discipline over "export" subsidies by
including non-agricultural primary products (such as minerals)
within the flat prohibition on such subsidies, by eliminating the
present requirement that a prohibited export subsidy be shown to
result in a lower price than that charged domestically, and by up-
dating an "illustrative list" of prohibited export subsidies main-
tained by the GATT for some years. Greater discipline over
export subsidies on agricultural, fishery and forestry products is
provided by defining more precisely the ways in which subsidies
on these products can give exporting countries a more than
equitable share of world trade (a key element in the GATT pro-
hibition of subsidies on such products).
In addition, the agreement promises greater regulation of
"domestic" subsidies by prohibiting signatories from using them
in a way that would seriously harm the trade interests of other
signatory countries, and by listing as "indicative guidelines" types
of domestic subsidies that may have adverse effects upon interna-
tional competition. At the same time, the agreement acknowl-
edges that these politically sensitive domestic subsidies "[a]re
intended to promote important objectives of national policy. .. "
The agreement provides two methods for importing countries
to offset the effects of subsidized imports. The first is the tradi-
tional one of applying countervailing duties to subsidized imports
that cause or threaten material injury to a domestic industry. The
second is the authorization, by a Committee of Signatories created
to settle disputes under the agreements, of "countermeasures" to
be taken by one signatory against the subsidy practices of another
which "nullify or impair" benefits accruing under the GATT to
the complaining party, or that result in "serious prejudice" to its
domestic industry. Countermeasures could take the form of ordi-
nary countervailing duties or other trade retaliation. The concept
of serious prejudice, moreover, includes not only adverse effects
upon industries in the importing country as a result of subsidized
imports, but also covers the loss of export markets if the subsi-
dized products of one country displace non-subsidized goods of
another within the subsidizing country ("import-substitution sub-
sidies") or in third countries where the subsidized and nonsub-
sidized, exports compete ("third-country market displacement").
The new agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties
would permit "provisional measures," consisting of temporary
penalty duties or other import restrictions, to be taken almost im-
1979]
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mediately in cases where there is a preliminary finding of injury
caused by subsidized imports, and where serious harm is threat-
ened unless rapid action is taken. In extreme cases, countervailing
duties could be imposed retroactively for up to ninety days prior
to the commencement of an investigation. The agreement would
additionally permit countervailing duties to be replaced by volun-
tary price undertakings.
The agreement recognizes that subsidies are an integral part of
developing countries' economic programs, and accordingly does
not subject LDC signatories to the flat prohibition on export sub-
sidies for non-primary products. Developing country signatories
instead would agree not to subsidize their industrial products in
ways that cause harm to the trade or production of other signa-
tories, but such harm ("serious prejudice") would not be presumed
by the Committee of Signatories in international cases involving
LDC export subsidies. It would, instead, have to be demonstrated
by positive evidence.
The Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee have made several detailed suggestions for United
States legislation to implement the agreement on subsidies and
countervailing duties." The most politically delicate problem, both
domestically and internationally, clearly involves the precise way
in which the injury standard is expressed in the United States
countervailing duty law. This injury standard is expected to be
applied only in countervailing duty investigations involving im-
ports from countries that are signatories of the subsidies/counter-
vailing agreement. The Treasury Department will continue to
countervail without a showing of injury against subsidized
imports from non-signatory countries. It is anticipated that the im-
plementing legislation also will revise the time limits and pro-
cedures for the conduct of countervailing duty investigations by
the Treasury Department.
2. Amendments to the International Antidumping Code
Several of the participants in the Tokyo Round put forward a
revision of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code," which was negotiated
by a group of industrialized countries during the Kennedy Round
" See note 18 supra.
Proposed Revision of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI Consequent to
the Present State of Negotiations on Subsidies/Countervailing Measures, GATT Doe.
COM.AD/W/90.
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to improve the GATT rules pertaining to sales of goods in an ex-
port market at "less than fair value." This revised version of the
Anti-Dumping Code brings certain of its provisions (notably those
concerning determination of injury, price undertakings between
exporting and importing countries, and imposition and collection
of anti-dumping duties) into line with the corresponding provi-
sions of the agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties.
In discussing implementation of the revised Anti-Dumping
Code, the Ways and Means and Finance Committees have sug-
gested a number of procedural amendments to United States anti-
dumping law2° These amendments would, among other things,
shorten considerably the time limits for completion of the various
stages of a dumping investigation.
3. Government Procurement
Government agencies buy for their own use everything from
spacecraft to paper clips. Nations ensure that most of this multi-
billion dollar market is reserved for domestic producers through
techniques ranging from formal "margins of preference," such as
those set forth in the "Buy American Act,""1 to exclusions of
foreign bidders, failure to advertise contracts or solicit bids, or
awarding of contracts without disclosure of criteria. All these
practices constitute significant non-tariff barriers to trade not
covered by current GATT rules.2
The agreement on government procurement covers purchases
that exceed approximately $195,000 (SDRs 150,000), by govern-
ment agencies specified in annexes to the agreement. These lists
of agencies subject to the code differ from signatory to signatory,
reflecting painstaking negotiations to ensure reciprocity. Such
reciprocity has not yet been achieved between the United States
and Japan. The U.S. Special Trade Representative announced on
March 29 that, as a result of the alleged inadequacy of the
Japanese offer with respect to agency coverage, the United States
would not at this time regard the agreement on government pro-
curement as applying between the governments of the United
Supra note 18.
II 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10c (1976). The regulations which implement the federal Buy Ameri-
can Act establish a six percent margin of preference. 41 C.F.R. § 1-18.603-1 (1977).
' Article III(8)(b) of the GATT exempts government purchasing from the "national treat-
ment" principle embodied in Article III, which requires non-discrimination between imports
and products of national origin in the application of taxes and other laws.
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States and Japan.3 Work continued on this problem during the
visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira to the United States in
early May.'
For those purchases and agencies covered, the government pro-
curement agreement prohibits discrimination between imported
products and those made domestically. The agreement also sets
forth detailed procedural rules designed to make the invitation
and award of government purchasing contracts more transparent.
Future rounds of negotiations are expected to bring additional
agencies within the coverage of the agreement. Special provisions
for developing countries specify that their lists of covered agen-
cies may reflect individual development, financial, and trade
needs, with least-developed countries making the smallest contri-
bution.
The government procurement agreement creates an interna-
tional committee of signatories, under GATT auspices, to adminis-
ter the agreement and to provide for the settlement of multilateral
disputes.
The United States implementing legislation will maintain exist-
ing "buy American" preferences, and other reservations, for pur-
chases below the $195,000 threshold and for purchases by agencies
not subject to the agreement. The benefits of the agreement for
purchases above the threshold by covered agencies will be extend-
ed to products of all signatories. It is not yet certain whether
products of non-signatories will be subject to existing margins of
discrimination or will in some cases be excluded from bidding for
government purchasing contracts altogether.
4. Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards)
Standards imposed to regulate the quality of imported goods
often can serve as a covert type of trade barrier, even where the
standard appears on its face to promote unimpeachable public
policy goals. For example, an ostensible "anti-pollution" standard
could be written in technical terms which disguised the fact that
its real purpose was to prevent the sale of Japanese cars. The
E.E.C. could require that American-made radios be certified by an
E.E.C. authority as conforming to Community electrical safety
standards, and then could decline to certify the products. Japan
See Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Press Release No. 303
(March 29, 1979).
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
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could refuse to accept the results of foreign tests of the safety of
gas stoves, and then subject foreign-made stoves to more strin-
gent or expensive tests than those applicable to the same pro-
ducts made in Japan.
The standards code 35 attempts to promote nondiscrimination
between domestic and imported products, as well as open and fair
procedures in the development and use of product standards, test
methods, and certification systems. The requirements of the code
are entirely procedural; they do not require adoption of any par-
ticular standards or related practices. The code would not, more-
over, prevent any government from adopting measures deemed
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health; the environment; national security; or the prevention of
deceptive practices, so long as these measures were not merely
disguised means of discriminating against imports.
The key requirement of the standards code is that product stan-
dards and related testing and certification are not to be used to
create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. In addition,
the code requires public notice and opportunities for comment
with respect to standards under development; that international
standards be used as the basis for new domestic standards where
appropriate; and that foreign testing and certification of conform-
ity with product standards be permitted where feasible.
The standards code applies to product standards and related
testing and certification of federal, state, regional, local, and pri-
vate entities. Central governments undertake to use "such reason-
able measures as may be available to them" to secure compliance
by non-federal bodies, and accept international responsibility for
such compliance. Special provisions call for technical assistance in
the standards area to be made available to developing countries.
Finally, the standards code creates an international Committee
on Technical Barriers to Trade, which will function under the
GATT to review operation of the code and deal with related dis-
putes.
5. Customs Valuation
The appraised value of goods for customs purposes is important
not only for the assessment of customs duties; it is also used as a
basis for other taxes and charges levied at the border and for the
' Draft Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.
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administration of licenses and import quotas based on the value of
goods. The customs valuation agreement has developed a new set
of international rules to harmonize divergent national valuation
systems and to reduce the likelihood of artificially inflated cus-
toms appraisals.
The current United States system for customs valuation is an
example of both the unpredictability and the artificially "inflating"
characteristics that many systems contain. Under the American
scheme, there are nine different methods for determining customs
value, depending on the product being valued and the circum-
stances under which it is imported. One of these nine valuation
methods is the controversial American Selling Price system, by
which certain products are valued for tariff purposes at the level
of the domestically produced articles with which they compete."
This American Selling Price system was first enacted in 1922 and
thus is protected by "grandfathering" against the GATT admoni-
tion that customs appraisals should not reflect "the value of mer-
chandise of national origin ... or fictitious values."3 The valuation
systems of most other nations also have controversial and protec-
tive features that create problems for American exporters.
The customs valuation code is intended to establish a fair, uni-
form, and neutral system for the valuation of goods for customs
purposes. The code establishes a "transaction value," defined as
the price actually paid or payable with additions for certain costs
possibly not reflected in that price, as the most preferred valua-
tion method. But transaction value cannot be used in many cases,
such as those involving non-arms-length transactions between a
subsidiary and its parent company. Accordingly, the draft code
establishes alternative bases of valuation, to be used in the follow-
ing order of precedence when transaction value is inappropriate:
the transaction value for an "identical good," preferably made by
the same manufacturer but sold in a different transaction; the
value of "similar goods" produced in the same country which are
commercially interchangeable; a "dednictive value" based on the
price of the good on resale after importation, minus expenses in-
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(e) (1976). The products subject to the American Selling Price system
include benzenoid chemicals, rubber footwear, and certain types of shellfish. For a detailed
description of the system, see Tariff and Trade Proposals: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 645 (1970) (Statement of Ambassador Carl
J. Gilbert, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations).
3' Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/229/Corr. 1.
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volved in the resale; and a "computed value" based on the esti-
mated cost of production.
Developing countries would be allowed to delay applying the
code for five years following the date of entry into force (January
1, 1981). They also would receive technical assistance to set up
new valuation systems based on the code.
The code also contains provisions on currency conversion, judi-
cial review, publication of customs laws and regulations, and the
prompt clearance of imported goods. An international Committee
on Customs Valuation, under GATT auspices, will supervise the
code's operation and facilitate consultations among signatories.
6. Import Licensing
Governments use import licenses both to collect data and to ad-
minister import restrictions. Import licensing systems may be
"automatic" (with licenses given freely) or "non-automatic" (with
licenses in effect constituting permits to import goods under
quota).
The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures' attempts to
ensure that licensing systems do not in themselves operate to
restrict imports. The licensing agreement requires that rules and
information regarding national licensing systems be published and
furnished to the GATT Secretariat. It further requires that appli-
cation forms be kept simple, that importers be given a reasonable
amount of time to complete them, and that, in most instances, a
single administrative body be made available to review applica-
tions. The agreement also prohibits refusal of applications for
licenses due to minor errors in documentation. Similarly, imports
covered by licenses cannot be refused because of minor variations
in value or quantity. Happily, the licensing agreement should not
require any changes in United States law.
C. Reforms of the International Trading Framework
In addition to calling for negotiations on tariffs and non-tariff
matters, the Tokyo Declaration stipulated that negotiators were
to consider "improvements in the international framework for the
conduct of world trade." This mandate gave rise to creation of a
negotiating group on "Framework" reform, which concluded the
five arrangements described below. 9
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/231.
GATT Doe. MTNIFR/W/20/Rev. 2.
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1. Developing Countries
One of the cornerstones of the GATT system has been the most-
favored nation principle, which in essence requires that imports
from all GATT Contracting Parties be treated equally. For years
developing countries have sought to modify this principle so that
industrialized countries could, consistently with the GATT, give
special advantages to LDC exports. One qualified success in this
effort was international acceptance, in the early 1970's, of the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), by which selected ex-
ports from developing countries are allowed to enter the markets
of developed countries at duty rates lower than those applicable
to the same products from developed countries."' In the Tokyo
Round the LDCs set out to secure a more permanent international
legal basis for the GSP and for other forms of preferences that
might be arranged in the future. In doing so they built upon the
recognition in the Tokyo Declaration that the negotiations might
result in "special and more favorable" treatment for the products
of developing countries "where appropriate and feasible."
The results of this effort are embodied in the text on Differen-
tial and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Par-
ticipation of Developing Countries. 1 This agreement is known more
commonly as the "enabling clause" because its key provision
establishes as a permanent principle of trade law that GATT Con-
tracting Parties may give unique preferential treatment to the
products of developing countries, notwithstanding the GATT's
most-favored nation provision. Permitted types of special treat-
ment include the GSP, provisions for LDCs in the non-tariff agree-
ments, regional or global trade arrangements among developing
countries, and extra-special treatment for the least-developed
countries. Qualifying provisions are designed to ensure that
special arrangements under the enabling clause do not merely
raise barriers to the trade of non-members of such arrangements
(such as by creating a bogus regional free trade area for the real
purpose of raising an impenetrable external tariff against non-
members), and that special treatment does not impede future
global tariff reductions.
In this text, the developed countries also reiterate and clarify
,0 For an extended discussion of the Generalized System of Preferences, see Graham,
The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries: International Inno-
vation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513 (1978).
" Supra note 39.
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the principle, already expressed in Part IV of the GATT, that
they do not expect full reciprocity from developing countries in
trade negotiations. This is done by stating specifically that devel-
oped countries do not expect LDCs to negotiate concessions "in-
consistent with their individual development, financial, and trade
needs.""2 As a price for these gains, the agreement expresses an
expectation of developing countries that their economies and
trade will so improve as to enable them to participate more fully
in the GATT system of rights and obligations.
2. Dispute Settlement
The provisions of the GATT for settling international trade dis-
putes have become increasingly ineffectual in recent years." Since
they specify no detailed procedures or time limits, cases may drag
on for years. In any event, GATT settlement mechanisms have
lost most of their bite because their ultimate sanction- authorized
trade retaliation against offending countries -has been used only
once, some 26 years ago.44
The Tokyo Round's Draft Understanding Regarding Notifica-
tion, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance45 attempts
to clarify procedures for dispute settlement by codifying an
"agreed description" of customary GATT practice in this area.
The text also tightens procedures by suggesting time limits both
for the establishment of panels of experts to hear complaints and
for the ultimate disposal of cases," by providing for a standing
roster of potential panelists to be maintained by the GATT Secre-
tariat, and by clarifying the functions and procedures of panels.
In addition to these refinements of the general provisions on
dispute settlement in the GATT, most of the individual non-tariff
codes contain their own sets of provisions for handling disputes
arising under those codes. The relationship between these sepa-
" GATT, Art. XXXVI, 8.
"3 See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of International Trade, 12 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 93 (1978); Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT,
72 AM. J. INT'L L. (1978); R. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES
(1978).
" Supra note 8.
" Supra note 39.
e The text states that"... The parties to [a] dispute would respond within a short period
of time, i.e., seven working days, to nominations of panel members by the Director-Gen-
eral .. ", id., at 3/4; and it further states that ". . . panels should aim to deliver their find-
ings without undue delay ... in cases or urgency the panel would be called upon to deliver
its findings within a period normally of three months .. ." ibid., at 3/6.
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rate new agreements and the general rules of the GATT with
respect to dispute settlement can only be clarified with precision
through case experience.
3. Other Framework Matters
The "Framework" sections of the texts initialed on April 12 also
include undertakings with respect to trade restrictions imposed to
restore balance of payments equilibrium, trade restrictive "safe-
guard" actions used for developmental purposes by LDCs, and
charges and other restrictions on exports. The principal result of
the declaration on trade restrictions for balance of payments
(BOP) purposes is to recognize that such restrictions may consist
of tariff surcharges as well as import quotas, which previously
were the only form of BOP-related restriction recognized by the
GATT. The text on safeguard actions for developmental purposes
accords LDCs somewhat greater flexibility in restricting imports
to protect their "infant industries" and for other development ob-
jectives. Finally, an understanding on export restrictions and
charges merely expresses the need to examine, after the Tokyo
Round, the adequacy of GATT provisions on this subject.
D. Sectoral Agreements
1. Agriculture
The Tokyo Round agreements apply to agricultural as well as
industrial products. In addition, governments signing the proc~s
verbal on April 12 undertook generally to make the GATT oper-
ate better with respect to agricultural trade, and concluded speci-
fic agreements on trade in dairy products and bovine meat.
a. Dairy
The new International Dairy Arrangement 7 consists of a gen-
eral agreement covering all dairy products, and three protocols
covering international trade in certain milk powders, milk fats (in-
cluding butter), and certain cheeses. The general agreement is
merely an undertaking to exchange information through an Inter-
national Dairy Products Council to be created within the GATT.
The three protocols set forth more detailed provisions, including
minimum prices, with respect to the milk powder, milk fat, and
cheese items covered.
GATT Doc. MTN/DP/8.
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b. Meat
An Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat' 8 covers trade in beef,
veal, and live cattle. The arrangement calls for establishment
within the GATT of an International Meat Council to monitor in-
ternational trade in meat and to provide for consultations and ex-
changes of information among member countries.
2. Aircraft
Some of the Tokyo Round participants'9 have concluded an
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft' which commits them to
eliminate by January 1, 1980, all customs duties and similar
charges on imported civil aircraft, aircraft parts, and repairs on
civil aircraft. This agreement contains an annex listing all prod-
ucts covered, which range from passenger airliners, helicopters,
gliders, and ground flight simulators to food warmers and oxygen
masks. The agreement does not cover military aircraft or military
aircraft parts.
3. Steel
An understanding on international trade in steel was developed
recently in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD). Although this understanding was not formally
part of the Tokyo Round, it was related closely to the negotia-
tions. This agreement establishes a Steel Committee under OECD
auspices, to encourage the continuation and extension of free
trade in steel, and to provide a means of disseminating informa-
tion and coordinating policies among governments with respect to
trade in steel. To supplement this OECD Steel Committee, MTN
tariff negotiators are exploring the possibility of tariff equaliza-
tion for steel on a product-by-product basis among the major
developed countries.
E. Negotiations Not Yet Concluded
Negotiations on trade in products bearing counterfeit trade-
marks or trade names, and on "safeguards" - temporary import
restrictive measures imposed to give an ailing domestic industry
opportunity to recover-reached an advanced stage but-were not
MTN/ME/8.
, Supra note 2.
oGATT Doe. MTN/W/38.
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concluded in time for inclusion in the April 12 process verbal. The
safeguards negotiation, which had attracted early attention as one
of the central issues in the Tokyo Round, stalled over the question
of whether, and in what circumstances, governments might take
safeguard import relief actions "selectively," i.e., against a par-
ticular product from one or two exporting countries rather than
from all exporters on a most-favored nation basis. The April 12
signatories agreed that safeguards negotiations should continue
urgently "with the objective of reaching agreement before 15 July
1979."51
IV. WHAT LIES AHEAD?
The Carter Administration currently plans the agreements in-
itialed on April 12 to Congress to submit in June accompanied by
a major proposal for new trade legislation and administrative
action to implement the agreements. The Congress then will have
some ninety working days to vote on this package, which cannot
be amended. If Congress approves the proposals, as appears likely
at this time, the Tokyo Round agreements will enter into force on
January 1, 1980.
United States implementing legislation is likely to contain some
important adjustments to the conduct of trade policy reaching
beyond those strictly necessary to implement the Tokyo Round."
One of these proposals is a strengthened provision for private sec-
tor complaints that other nations have violated the new agreement
or the GATT, or have engaged in other unfair trade practices.8 The
implementing legislation will almost certainly shorten deadlines
and alter other procedures for investigating alleged illegal dump-
ing or subsidy practices, and will provide for greater participation
by private sector advisors in preparing the defense and prose-
cution of international trade complaints. It appears probable,
moreover, that the "fast-track" procedures for implementing in-
ternational non-tariff commitments will become a permanent
feature of U.S. law, perhaps making a reality of the conventional
prediction that the Tokyo Round would mark the end of periodic
negotiating "rounds" because hereafter adjustments to the
' Supra note 1.
5 The expedited implementation procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. 2112 and 2191 are
available to be used for legislative proposals that are "necessary or appropriate" to imple-
ment non-tariff trade agreements.
' It appears that this will take the form of amendments to section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976).
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trading system will be negotiated more or less continuously.
Congressional enactment of the Tokyo Round agreements will
mark only the beginning of a new stage, rather than the end, of a
process of revising international trading rules which began with
the Tokyo Declaration in 1973. The new dispute settlement pro-
cedure provided for both the GATT and the various non-tariff
agreements must be tested -particularly the relationship be-
tween these two sets of new rules. Another worrisome problem is
the effect on the GATT system of applying some of the new codes
on a "conditional MFN" basis, denying the benefits of the agree-
ments to non-signatories -even GATT-member non-signatories.
Notwithstanding the difficulties which may lie ahead, the
miracle of the Tokyo Round is simply that it was concluded, with
some apparent success, in the face of truly formidible technical
complexities and despite unfavorable economic and political cir-
cumstances. This example offers some hope for international
cooperation in a dangerous world.
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